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SEPARATED BY A COMMON LANGUAGE? AN
EXAMINATION OF THE TRANSATLANTIC
DIALOGUE ON DATA PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY
IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
YESHA YADAV*
I. INTRODUCTION
I don't believe Europeans value privacy more than Americans.
And I don't think that Europeans take the threat of terrorism
lightly. I do think, though, that there are some historical
differences that cause us to look at some of these issues in
different ways.
On June 23, 2006, The New York Times reported that the Central
Intelligence Agency ("C.I.A.") of the United States, together with
the U.S. Treasury, secretly accessed a vast database of financial
records as part of U.S. intelligence efforts to combat terrorism. 2
The surveillance, which commenced shortly after September 11,
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Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (www.capmktsreg.org). Prior to
coming to Harvard in 2008, she worked as an attorney at Clifford Chance, London
(2004-2008), specializing in its financial regulation and derivatives practice. She is
currently working for the Legal Vice-Presidency of the World Bank, in the
Insolvency and Creditor Rights and in its Financial Regulation, Markets and
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1. Michael Chertoff, U.S. Sec'y of Homeland Sec., Remarks to the Johns
Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (May
3, 2007) (transcript available at DHS Press Room Archive website).
2. Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data is Sified in Secret to Block
Terror, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 2006, at Al.
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2001, provided U.S. intelligence services with access to a massive
reserve of financial records held by the Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Communication ("SWIFT"), a Belgium-based
provider of messaging services for financial institutions around the
world.3 In addition to the general outcry provoked by this action
within the European Union ("EU"), EU officials determined that
SWIFT's cooperation with U.S. intelligence agencies was in
violation of EU and Belgian data privacy laws.4
The SWIFT case illustrates the legal and political conflict
between the U.S. and the EU with respect to the sharing of
sensitive information. This conflict has intensified during the years
following September 11, 2001, as the escalating U.S.-led "War on
Terror" has focused considerable international regulatory attention
on data-sharing between the U.S. and its allies in their effort to
combat terrorism. In light of past conflicts between the U.S. and
the EU with respect to airline passenger information, it is unlikely
that the SWIFT case will be the last incident in this area.
This paper examines recent controversies in the legal and policy
debate between the U.S. and the EU on the sharing of data in the
implementation of transatlantic counter-terrorism measures. The
nexus between law and policy in this area is particularly close,
reflecting the preferences each jurisdiction has in protecting civil
liberty and security interests. While the U.S. and the EU offer
differing legal frameworks on data privacy, the strategic
importance of data in counter-terrorism law and policy necessitates
a joint approach. A failure to arrive at such an approach can result
in a series of bilateral agreements between the U.S. and individual
EU countries, creating unnecessary costs, inconvenience, and
uncertainty for both users and processors of data. The haphazard
approach in the past, and the continuing failure to come to a proper
accord, reflects the tension between civil liberties and the right of
the state to erode such entitlements in the face of a terrorist threat.
In addition, the failure to come to an accord reflects the uneasiness
U.S. and EU lawmakers feel about the compromises they have
3. See id.
4. Edwin Jacobs, SWIFT Privacy: Data Processor Becomes Data Controller,
12 J. INTERNET BANKING & COM. 1, 3 (2007).
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already made. Fortunately, skirmishes over the cross-border
transfer of data can encourage both sides to incorporate elements
from the differing approaches into their respective policy regimes.
Part II of this paper sets out a factual summary of the recent
cases involving the transfer of airline passenger data between the
EU and the U.S. This section will also analyze U.S. intelligence
authorities' access to the SWIFT database. Part III sets out a
discussion of the policies underlying data privacy laws in the U.S.
and the EU. Part IV critically examines a proposed solution to the
issue, and the policy implications of the steps taken to further legal
decision-making in this area. Finally, Part V provides some
concluding remarks.
II. OVERVIEW OF KEY CASES
1. Transfer of Passenger Name Record Data ("PNR data")5
Pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act enacted
in 2001, all airlines flying into the U.S. are required to provide the
Commissioner of Customs with certain data relating to passengers
6and cabin crew. Furthermore, following the passage of the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act in 2002,
each incoming and outgoing commercial airliner must provide
detailed information on each passenger and crewmember to the
5. PNR data is the name given to the detailed travel records that are created
by airlines for each passenger. A PNR will usually contain the details of a
passenger including her name, address, fare details, forms of payment used,
special service requests such as meal preferences, passport details, date of birth
and place of birth. A number of airlines host their PNR databases with a central
computer reservation system, or global distribution service provider such as Sabre,
Galileo, Worldspan or Amadeus. This means that airlines can centrally pool their
PNR records with one provider and share the information, if necessary.
Increasingly, such database providers allow travel agents and airlines to book
rental cars and hotels as well as air travel. The PNR data for each trip remains
within the database even in cases where the trip has been cancelled or altered by
the passenger. See Press Release from Franco Fratlini, Vice President, European
Commission, The Passenger Name Record (PNR): Frequently Asked Questions,
MEMO/07/294 (July 13, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=MEMO/07/294&format-HTML&aged=0&language=EN&g
uiLanguage=en.
6. See 49 U.S.C. § 44909(c) (2006).
2009] 75
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Immigration and Naturalization Service.7 U.S. authorities have the
right under U.S. law to access a large amount of passenger data
collected in the reservation and departure control systems
("DCS"),8 and share it with federal agencies for the purposes of
fighting terrorism.9 Such information not only includes basic PNR
data, but also other information such as credit card numbers, bank
details, telephone number, dietary preferences (which may
potentially reveal details about a passenger's religious or ethnic
origins), history of preceding and/or planned travel, and medical
conditions or contact details for emergency contact persons. 10
Provision of such detailed and comprehensive information by
European airlines and database providers to U.S. authorities was
considered by European authorities to be incompatible with
Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to
the processing and free movement of such data." In particular,
there was concern that U.S. demands would violate this Directive
7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1221 (2006).
8. See 49 U.S.C. § 44909(c). The DCS contains the passenger name record
for all passengers irrespective of whether the passenger is landing or leaving from
the U.S. See Jacobs, supra note 4.
9. See 19 C.F.R. § 122.49(a) (2009). It should be noted that European
authorities, in the wake of the 2004 Madrid bombings, instituted measures to
require air carriers to supply Advance Passenger Information ("API data") to
Member State border control authorities. See Council Directive 2004/82, 2004 O.J.
(L 261) 24 (EC). However, the scope of the information-sharing requirement is
more limited under this Directive. See id. art. 3(2). API data forms only one part of
the PNR record and extends to cover the passenger's name, date of birth, passport
number and point of embarkation. In addition, the Directive requires API data to
be destroyed after 24 hours unless it is needed for either the exercise of statutory
functions, or for law enforcement purposes. See id art. 6(1). In contrast, PNR data
is a great deal more detailed, covering such items as payment information, dietary
preferences, airlines' or travel agents' remarks about a passenger, baggage
information, and may be retained for a number of years under U.S. law.
10. Electronic Privacy Information Center, EU-US Airline Passenger Data
Disclosure, http://epic.org/privacy/intl/passenger_data.htrnl (last visited Sept. 9,
2009).
11. See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 6/2002 on Transmission
of Passenger Manifest Information and Other Data from Airlines to the United
States, § 2, 11647/02/EN, WP 66 (Oct. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Working Party,
Opinion 6/2002], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacy/docs
/wpdocs/2002/wp66_en.pdf. See generally Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L
281) 31 (EC).
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by mandating that data, originally collected for a commercial
purpose, would be used for a secondary purpose, namely for
gathering intelligence for counter-terrorism efforts. 12 In addition,
the Directive prohibits the transfer of data to countries outside of
the EU if these countries do not provide an "adequate level of
protection" for the data.13 The U.S., considered as lacking a
comprehensive regulatory framework for data privacy (discussed
further below), was prima facie deemed to lack an "adequate level
of protection."l 4 However, transfers of personal data between the
U.S. and the EU could still take place within a bilaterally
negotiated agreement, or with the consent of the subject whose data
was subject to the transfer. 15 Finally, there was concern that once
data was provided to the U.S., European data privacy authorities
would no longer be able to exercise control over the management
of the data16 and that the data itself was then liable to be treated
without a sufficiently robust standard of protection. 17
Accordingly, the legal demands made by U.S. authorities on
European airlines regarding detailed passenger data necessitated
joint regulatory and political action to ensure compatibility with the
Directive. 18 Consequently, EU and U.S. authorities came to a
12. See Working Party, Opinion 6/2002, supra note 11, § 2.4.
13. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 25(1). "Adequacy" is
measured in relation to the individual data transfer, taking into account a variety of
circumstances, including "purpose and duration" of the processing, the security
measures in place for protecting the data, and the rule of law of the country of
transfer. Id. art. 25(2).
14. See Working Party, Opinion 6/2002, supra note 11, § 2.5.
15. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 26.
16. See generally Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 4/2003 on the
Level of Protection Ensured in the US for the Transfer of Passengers' Data,
11070/03/EN, WP 78 (June 13, 2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice
home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp78_en.pdf.
17. See Working Party on the Prot. of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data, Opinion 1/99 Concerning the Level of Data
Protection in the United States and the Ongoing Discussions between the
European Commission and the United States Government, l 1, 5092/98/EN/final,
WP 15 (Jan. 26, 1999), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/
docs/wpdocs/1999/wpl 5en.pdf.
18. See Caitlin Friedemann, Council Decision Regarding Agreement Between
the European Community and the United States on the Use of Passenger Name
Record Data, 11 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 207 (2004/2005) (discussing the regulatory
2009] 77
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provisional agreement in May 2004, in which the European
Commission, likely submitting to political pressure and without the
support of the European Parliament, declared that U.S. data privacy
laws could be considered "adequate" for the purposes of protecting
the transfer of airline data and subsequent data collection by U.S.
authorities.19 However, following protests by the European
Parliament and a subsequent legal challenge to its validity, this
agreement was held to be null and void by the European Court of
Justice. In July 2007, a revised agreement was concluded to ensure
that U.S. authorities agreed to conditions for protecting data
gathered from EU airlines.20
The July 2007 agreement between the U.S. and the EU (the
"PNR Agreement") permits the transfer of airline data on the basis
of assurances given by the Department of Homeland Security for
the processing and handling of such data. 21 Accordingly, it has
been agreed that the data shall be used and shared for limited,
defined purposes, i.e., "combating: (1) terrorism and related crimes;
(2) other serious crimes ... that are transitional in nature; and (3)
flight from warrants or custody."22 The PNR data may also be used
"where necessary for the protection of the vital interests of the data
subject or other persons, or in any criminal judicial proceedings, or
as otherwise required by law." 23 Sharing of PNR data between law
enforcement and intelligence bodies may be undertaken only on a
limited and proportionate basis.24 Moreover, the transfer of the data
and legislative developments).
19. See id.
20. See Council Decision 2007/551, 2007 O.J. (L 204) 16 (EU); see also
Franziska Boehm, Confusing Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe:
Loopholes in Europe's Fundamental Rights Protection Exemplified on European
Data Protection Rules (Univ. of Luxembourg Faculty of Law, Econ. and Fin.,
Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2009-0 1), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract- 1348472.
21. See Council Decision 2007/551, supra note 20.
22. Letter from Michael Chertoff, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., to Luis Amado,
President of the European Council, regarding DHS Policies on the Processing and
Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers (July 23, 2007) §
I, available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/pnr-2007agreement-
usltrtoeu.pdf.
23. Id.
24. See id. § II.
HeinOnline  -- 36 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 78 2009-2010
SEPARATED BY A COMMON LANGUAGE?
to third-party countries may, with the exception of emergency
cases, only be carried out after determining the reasons for
requesting such access and on assurances that such data will be
adequately protected. 25 Further, sensitive data (disclosing, inter
alia, religious beliefs or ethnic origins, political and philosophical
beliefs) is filtered and not retained, unless the data is required for
an exceptional use. 26 The filtered PNR data collected by the U.S.
can be retained for an initial period of seven years, after which, it
may be accessed only with special permission. 2 7 Under the
agreement, the Department of Homeland Security may
electronically access the airline databases within the European
Union in advance of the airlines transfering the data to the U.S. 28
The agreement underscores the importance of a "push" system,
whereby the data transferred to the U.S. is filtered for
appropriateness, rather than a "pull" system (which may still be
operated until such time as airlines can use "push" technology) that
absorbs all data before filtering it. 2 9
2. SWIFT and the Transfer of Financial Data
SWIFT provides messaging services between financial
institutions for the transmission of data relating to financial
transactions worldwide. Structured as a not-for-profit industry-
owned co-operative under Belgian law,30 SWIFT has a number of
offices in countries around the world, including the U.S. It is
overseen by a board of the world's major banks, including several
central banks, such as the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of
25. See id.
26. Id. § III.
27. Id. § VII.
28. See Agreement on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record
(PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), U.S.-EU, July 26, 2007, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrarylassets/pnr-
2007agreement-usversion.pdf.
29. See Letter from Michael Chertoff to Luis Amado, supra note 22, § VIII
(discussing "push" and "pull" systems in the context of PNR data transfers).
30. SWIFT - Governance at SWIFT, http://www.swift.com/aboutswift/
company information/governance/governance atswift.page? (last visited Sept. 9,
2009).
2009] 79
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England, the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank.
SWIFT provides a routing mechanism for banking data, rather than
operating as a bank and does not hold accounts.32 It is estimated
that SWIFT is responsible for providing messaging services for
approximately six trillion dollars in financial transactions daily.33
In light of its importance to the worldwide banking
infrastructure, the data held by SWIFT was considered by the
C.I.A. and the U.S. Treasury to be a particularly valuable source of
financial intelligence in U.S. counter-terrorism efforts.34 SWIFT
data had the potential to provide widespread international coverage
as well as, if required, an understanding of the patterns of financial
transactions taking place within U.S. borders. The New York
Times reported that U.S. intelligence authorities had initially
considered taking action to monitor the SWIFT database in secret,
but eventually chose to compel access to the database by serving
SWIFT with broad administrative subpoenas under the U.S.
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program ("TFTP").3 6 The subpoenas
served on SWIFT were reviewed only by U.S. Treasury officials, in
consultation with the Justice Department, but were not reviewed by
any judicial body.37 Given SWIFT's nature as a bank messaging
service rather than a bank, officials concluded that SWIFT did not
benefit from protection under banking secrecy laws.3  The
subpoenas required that SWIFT provide the C.I.A. and the U.S.
Treasury with specified financial records maintained by its U.S.
operations center as collected in the course of its everyday
31. SWIFT - Oversight at SWIFT, http://www.swift.com/aboutswift/
companyinformation/govemance/oversight-of swift.page? (last visited Sept. 9,
2009).
32. SWIFT - Company Information, http://www.swift.com/about-swift/
company-informationlindex.page?lang-en (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).
33. See Courtney Shea, Note, A Need for Swift Change: The Struggle Between
the European Union's Desire for Privacy in International Financial Transactions
and the United States' Need for Security from Terrorists as Evidenced by the
SWIFT Scandal, 8 J. HIGH TECH. L. 143, 152-53 (2008).
34. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 2.
35. See id.
36. See Lichblau & Risen, supra note 2; Shea, supra note 33, at 151.
37. See Lichblau & Risen, supra note 2.
38. See id.
HeinOnline  -- 36 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 80 2009-2010
SEPARATED BY A COMMON LANGUAGE?
operations.
Notwithstanding the status of SWIFT as a messaging service, the
C.I.A. and U.S. Treasury subpoenas enabled access to information
regarding the bank accounts and financial details of individuals and
companies, including U.S. persons. 4 0 SWIFT data obtained under
the program included identifying information on the payer and the
payee of transactions, including their names, bank account
numbers, addresses, national identification numbers and other
personal data.4 1 Whilst safeguards were said to have been put in
place to limit undue monitoring of transactions relating to U.S.
persons, as well as to limit the scope of surveillance to searches
based on intelligence leads, the extent of the access may
nevertheless be considered significant, particularly given the
limited legal review to which the subpoenas had been subject.42
The EU Privacy Commission and the Belgian Data Privacy
Commissioner's initial findings deemed SWIFT in breach of its
data privacy obligations because it allowed U.S. authorities a
disproportionate level of access and failed to inform the EU
Privacy Commission and the Belgian Data Privacy Commission of
its disclosures to the C.I.A and the U.S. Treasury.4 3 The Article 29
Working Party, the EU's advisory body on matters relating to data
privacy law, stated that "the hidden, systematic, massive and long-
term transfer of personal data by SWIFT to the UST in a
confidential, non-transparent and systematic manner for years
constitutes a violation of the fundamental European principles as
regards data protection and is not in accordance with Belgian and
European law."" Indeed, the mere fact of having an operating
39. Notice: Publication of U.S./EU Exchange of Letters and Terrorist Finance
Tracking Program Representations of the United States Department of the
Treasury, 72 Fed. Reg. 60054, 60055 (Oct. 23, 2007) [hereinafter U.S./EU
Exchange of Letters].
40. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 2.
41. See U.S./EU Exchange of Letters, 72 Fed. Reg. at 60057.
42. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 2.
43. See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 3.
44. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 10/2006 on the Processing
of Personal Data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT), at 26, 01935/06/EN, WP 128 (Nov. 22, 2006)
[hereinafter Working Party, Opinion 10/2006], available at http://ec.europa.eu/
2009] 81
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center in the U.S. could be considered a breach of data protection
principles by placing SWIFT within the technical reach of U.S.
subpoenas.45 Indeed, the mere fact of having an operating center in
the U.S. could be considered a breach of data protection principles
by placing SWIFT within the technical reach of U.S. subpoenas.4 6
As with the PNR data, high-level political discussions
culminated in an ad hoc compromise, which secured the conditions
under which SWIFT could continue to provide access to its
database. The compromise describes (i) the legal authority of the
U.S. to issue subpoenas allowing for the collection and subsequent
use of the data; (ii) arrangements for the handling and processing of
the data, specifying that the data may only be used for the purposes
of counter-terrorism, may only be handled by persons with
designated authorized status to access and use SWIFT data, and
must be stored under secure conditions; and (iii) provisions to
review the arrangements in place and the appointment of an
"eminent European" to conduct regular oversight of the
arrangements. 7 However, the European Parliament recently voted
to reject the compromise for failing to include sufficiently robust
privacy and data protection guarantees. 48 Consequently, EU
officials and the U.S. Treasury will need to negotiate another
solution to share European bank transfer records. This turn of
events is evidence of the continued tension between protecting civil
liberties and security interests.
3. Implications for a Wider Solution
The PNR data and SWIFT cases highlight the practical
implications of the incompatibility between the EU and U.S. data
justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/wpl28_en.pdf.
45. See id. at 9.
46. See Id.
47. See U.S./EU Exchange of Letters, supra note 41, at 60058-63.
48. See EUROPA Press Release, The European Parliament Votes Against the
EU-US Provisional Agreement on Transfer of Bank Data for Counter-Terrorism
Purposes: Commission Reaction (Feb. 11, 2010), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/152; see also
Constant Brand, MEPs Threaten to Derail EU-US Data-Transfer,
EUROPEANVOICE, Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/meps-
threaten-to-derail-eu-us-data-transfer-deal/67037.aspx.
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protection laws and policies. In particular, the cases illustrate a
largely reactive position adopted by both regulatory authorities.
Notwithstanding the strategic importance of sound data collection
in their counter-terrorism policies, the U.S. and the EU took
remedial actions only after the issues were identified as politically
and legally problematic.
Furthermore, the ad hoc solutions that were formulated are
limited to the discrete problems they were designed to control. The
solutions imposed a broad, negotiated legal and policy
compromise, without establishing a detailed framework to manage
different situations, or rules and principles for dealing with other
categories of data that may necessitate regulation going forward.49
While the urgency of each situation may have necessitated a speedy
and expedient solution to ensure that otherwise "blameless" service
providers, such as airlines and SWIFT, could continue to operate,
the failure to arrive at a global response reflects an underlying
unease at the EU level. Indeed, as detailed above, the SWIFT
compromise now requires further discussions and re-negotiation
between EU and U.S. authorities following its repudiation by the
European Parliament. This unease is not only due to the divergence
in approaches to data privacy regulation by the U.S. and the EU,
but is also a result of the tenor of U.S. national security laws and
policies, and the potential impact such measures have on the
protection afforded to EU data abroad.
Indeed, as set out above, the Article 29 Working Party
condemned the transfer of data by SWIFT to the U.S. in very
strong terms.50 The Working Party's criticism is further echoed by
experts. By way of illustration, expert testimony before the Article
29 Working Party and the European Parliament's LIBE Committee
on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, contended that U.S.
assurances on data protection could be circumvented by using
various legislative tools, such as national security letters or court
orders, that are available to intelligence agencies.51 These orders
49. There are, however, proposals for creating such principles. See discussion
infra Part Ill.
50. See Working Party, Opinion 10/2006, supra note 44.
51. See Written Testimony of Edward Hasbrouck, The Identity Project, before
the LIBE Comm. of the European Parliament and the Art. 29 Working Party,
2009] 83
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would not have to be disclosed to the database operators, or
airlines, for reasons of national security; furthermore, they may
also be unreviewable under the "state secrets privilege."S2
In light of the practical difficulties of checking compliance with,
and enforcing the terms of, agreements involving U.S. intelligence
agencies, the EU has instead chosen to grant the U.S. access only to
limited types of data (e.g., PNR data, SWIFT's database). This
approach permits the EU to retain political leverage and control
over access to other types of data, including the vast databases
containing personal information such as credit card usage, Internet
searches, employment history and the like. On the one hand, such
leverage may enable the EU to exert some influence in the
evolution of the U.S. data privacy framework. On the other hand,
this creates legal uncertainty for service providers and individuals
whose data may be at risk. In any event, in the absence of a jointly
negotiated solution, the U.S. can unilaterally engage individual
countries for access to data53 in addition to pursuing access through
secret administrative subpoenas when service providers are located
within the U.S.
III. DATA PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY IN THE EU AND THE U.S.
1. Possible Reasons for Divergence
The cases discussed above reflect an underlying divergence in
approach to data privacy and policy between the U.S. and the EU.
Commentators have suggested that this outcome is puzzling, given
that the evolution of data privacy law in both regions has taken
Transfers of PNR Data from the E.U. to the U.S. (Mar. 26, 2007),
http://www.hasbrouck.org/IDP/IDP-PNR-26MAR2007.pdf
52. See id.
53. The U.S. has been criticized for negotiating bilaterally with EU countries,
formerly part of the Eastern bloc, which do not benefit from the U.S. visa waiver
program. For example, the U.S. signed an accord with the Czech Republic
granting visa waiver status to Czech travelers to the U.S., but demanded in return
that additional registration forms be filled out. See Current Affairs: New
Agreement Paves Way for Visa-Free Travel to US for Czech Citizens (Radio Praha
radio broadcast Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://www.radio.cz/en/
article/101320.
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place on the basis of common principles.54 In fact, by signing and
ratifying the same multi lateral conventions, such as the 1980
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-
border Flows of Personal Data, both regions even agreed to comply
with the same principles regarding data privacy.ss While the U.S.
approach is necessarily shaped by the particularities of the federal
structure, the EU has sought to adopt and implement a harmonized
set of data privacy laws across the twenty-seven Member States,
despite considerable differences in their constitutional make-up and
regulatory and technological infrastructures.56 It has been noted
that the divergence may be attributable to sharp contrasts in basic
cultural legacies.57 While the EU prefers an approach geared
toward harmonization (consistent with the basic jurisprudence
underlying the development of the Internal Market within the EU)
the U.S. seeks a more decentralized, self-regulatory model.
Furthermore, the historical legacy of the Holocaust provides
additional explanation for the differences in this area. The
collective memory of the Holocaust marks Europeans as naturally
more circumspect with respect to control of their personal data,
since it had once been used for singling out members of the Jewish
community for persecution. 59 Finally, some commentators identify
a tendency within EU communities to place greater trust in central
government than in corporations, whereas the opposite applies in
the U.S. 6 0 This tendency within the U.S. leads to a more
pronounced emphasis on industry self-regulation, rather than on
federal legislation, to control the flow and processing of personal
54. DoROTHEE HEISENBERG, NEGOTIATING PRIVACY: THE EUROPEAN UNION,
THE UNITED STATES AND PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 26 (2005).
55. Id. at 8.
56. Id. at 9.
57. The Future of Money: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and
Int'l Monetary Policy of the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services, 104th Cong.
32-33 (1996) (statement of Dr. Alan F. Westin, Professor of Public Law and
Gov't, Columbia Univ.).
58. See id.
59. See Bob Sullivan, 'La diference' is stark in EU, U.S. Privacy Laws,
MSNBC, Oct. 19, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15221Ill11/.
60. See id.
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data."
As such, while the core foundational principles may once have
been the same, their transposition into and interaction with
differing regulatory structures in the U.S. and the EU have created
a divergent framework. In these two current systems, the normative
balance among the different interests involved varies in emphasis.
The explosive increase of information on the Internet, automated
digital processing, and instantaneous transfers of data across the
globe has brought these differences into sharper focus. 62
Furthermore, the differing levels of power granted to law
enforcement and intelligence agencies under national security
legislation impact the interpretation of data privacy laws and the
extent to which privacy rights can be subverted in the interest of
state security.
2. Overview of Approaches - European Union
It has been argued that the EU data privacy regime is premised
on the primacy of a right to the privacy and proper processing of
personal data.63 Indeed, Directive 95/46 begins by stating that the
European Union seeks to "protect [an individual's] right to privacy
with respect to the processing of personal data." 64 The Directive
may be seen as reflecting the principles set out in the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,65 OECD Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of Personal Data, 66
the 1981 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of
61. See id.; see also HEISENBERG, supra note 54, at 26-27, 39.
62. See PHILLIP B. HEYMANN AND JULIETTE N. KAYEMM, PROTECTING
LIBERTY IN AN AGE OF TERROR 75 (2007).
63. See STEPHEN KABERA KARANJA, TRANSPARENCY AND PROPORTIONALITY
IN THE SCHENGEN INFORMATION SYSTEM AND BORDER CONTROL CO-OPERATION
136 (2008).
64. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 1.1.
65. See KARANJA, supra note 63, at 262, 454.
66. See HEISENBERG, supra note 54, at 8. The Guidelines endorse eight
principles to guide data privacy protection strategies: (1) limitations on data
collection; (2) standards for data quality; (3) data purpose specifications; (4)
limitations on the use of data; (5) reasonable security safeguard requirements; (6)
disclosure of data retained; (7) the ability of an individual to correct inaccurate
data; and (8) accountability for compliance for the holder of data. See KARANJA,
supra note 63, at 135.
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Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data, 7 as well as Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which enshrines a basic right of an individual to his private
life. 6 8 The Directive, applying equally to public and private
entities,69 seeks to harmonize data privacy and processing rules and
standards across the Member States for personal data.70
Directive 95/46 sets out strict conditions for the processing of
personal data, so that the use of data is limited to "legitimate
purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with
those purposes." 7 For example, personal data is to be processed
only with the consent of the data subject, or in "compliance with a
legal obligation."72 The Directive also regulates the transfer of data
to third-party countries, requiring that such countries provide an
"adequate level of protection" for the data transferred. Under
Article 8, the processing of "sensitive" personal data, relating to the
religious beliefs, ethnic origin, philosophical views, etc. of a data
subject is severely restricted.74 Articles 16 and 17 of the Directive
require data controllers to safeguard the confidentiality of the
data.7 The Directive also prohibits "significant" decisions to be
made based on data collected by controllers.7 6
Although, Article 13 of Directive 95/46 permits Member States
to restrict the rights granted by this Directive, the scope is limited
to purposes such as national security or public defense.77 However,
any such restriction must be a "necessary measure" for the purpose
sought. Accordingly, it has been determined that the scope of this
exemption must be narrowly construed, and as suggested by the
67. See KARANJA, supra note 63, at 5 n.8.
68. See id. at 86, 135-36.
69. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 2(e)-(g).
70. See id. art. 30.1(a).
71. Id. art. 6.1(b).
72. Id. art. 7(a), (c).
73. Id. art. 25(1).
74. Id. art. 8.
75. See id. art. 16, 17.
76. See id. art. 15(1). This provision may be used in limiting the extent to
which profiling is permissible on the basis of data gathered on an individual.
77. See id. art. 13(1).
7R8 Id.
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words "necessary measure," limited to specific cases.79 Article 13
is therefore unsuitable as a legal basis for the general surveillance
of transferred data by U.S. intelligence authorities.
It is also worth noting that Directive 95/46 does not apply to data
collected "outside the scope of [European] Community law," in
addition to data collected in the course of operations directed
toward defense, state security and criminal law activity of the
state.80 This state criminal law activity exemption falls mostly
under the so-called Pillar III of the European Union; Pillar III deals
with police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters such as
terrorism. 1 However, with respect to PNR and SWIFT data (and,
looking forward, presumably data collected by private agents, such
as credit card companies and Internet service providers), it can be
argued that such data was originally collected for purposes other
than national security and law enforcement. This sort of data, such
as air travel bookings and financial transactions, can easily be
deemed to fall within the scope of Pillar I, and therefore, within the
scope of the Directive. In any event, while the Directive does not
apply to data collected expressly under Pillar III, on November 27,
2008 the EU approved a framework for regulating private data
falling under Pillar III, which framework sets out principles for
sharing police and judicial data among EU law enforcement
agencies.82 Under Article 13 of this framework, data transfers to
third-party countries may only take place where, inter alia, the
transmission of data is necessary for the "prevention, investigation,
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of
criminal penalties" and the recipient country can guarantee an
adequate level of protection for the data. The civil liberties
implications of transferring personal data on criminal and terrorist-
related matters may require that the determination of "adequacy"
79. See Working Party, Opinion 6/2002, supra note 11, art. 29.
80. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 3(2).
81. EUROPA - Glossary - Pillars of the European Union, http://europa.eu/
scadplus/glossary/eupillarsen.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).
82. See Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, Protection of Personal
Data Processed in the Framework of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal
Matters, 2008 O.J. (L 350) 60 (EU).
83. Id. art. 13.
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meet a higher threshold. On a related note, in the wake of
September 11, 2001, the European Council agreed to authorize
additional sharing of data between European agencies. 4 However,
the scope of this sharing was restricted to the transfer of data on
terrorism and terrorist financing, rather than any broader agreement
to share wholesale databases between national authorities or to take
unfiltered personal data across borders.s
Finally, there is some concern that any system applied to sharing
data between the U.S. and EU must also be applied to intra-EU
information exchange mechanisms. 86 Such a proposal may have the
potential to further erode the limitations on the transfer of data set
out in Directive 95/46.
3. Overview of Approaches - United States
By contrast, the U.S. does not provide an overarching legal
framework for the protection of personal data. 87 Neither the U.S.
Constitution" nor the Bill of Rights expressly recognizes a right to
privacy, leaving its parameters to be formed incrementally through
89
legal commentary,89 case law, and specific sectoral legislation
granting a right to privacy in certain areas, such as financial
84. See European Council, Conclusions and Plan of Action of the
Extraordinary European Council Meeting on Sept. 21, 2001, SN 140/01, 2 (EU),
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressData/
en/ec/140.en.pdf.
85. See id. at 2-3.
86. For an example involving PNR, see Commission Proposal for a Council
Framework Decision on the Use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for Law
Enforcement Purposes, COM (2007) 654 final (Nov. 6, 2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/commissionbarroso/frattinilarchive/COM%282007%29654%
20EN.pdf.
87. See HEISENBERG, supra note 54, at 32.
88. In contrast, a number of state constitutions do recognize a right to privacy.
See National Conference of State Legislatures, Privacy Protections in State
Constitutions, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/stateconstpriv03.htm (last
visited Sept. 17, 2009) (consisting of the states Alaska, Arizona, California,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington).
89. In 1890, Judges Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argued for the
creation of a "right to be left alone." Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 195 (1891). Substantiating the formulation,
Professor Prosser identified four different components to the right in the context of
tort law. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
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services and consumer reporting. 90 The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, has broadly interpreted the Bill of Rights to include a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in the context of government
surveillance, religious activity, political party membership and
family relations." Nevertheless, the Court has also held that this
limited right does not extend to the transfer of personal data to third
parties.92
The Privacy Act of 1974, an ostensibly wide-ranging piece of
legislation, sets out a broad regime for federal agencies to
implement fair information practices.93 While the Act sets out five
principles broadly reflecting the OECD Guidelines, the level of
protection that it provides may have largely eroded through the
application of broad exceptions and subsequent interpretations
(e.g., personal data may be disclosed for "routine use"). 94 In the
aftermath of September 11, 2001, a number of federal bodies, such
as the National Crime Information Center, have been exempted
from the Act's provisions." Crucially, the Privacy Act does not
provide the opportunity for anyone other than U.S. citizens and
permanent residents to seek redress for improper processing of
their personal data held by federal agencies, which creates a
sticking point in current negotiations between the EU and the
U.S.96
90. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801-09 (2006).
91. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas., 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (right to sexual
privacy); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (right to private
communications); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (right to
marital privacy); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) (right to
private associations). But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (no right to
private, undisclosed arrest).
92. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1976) (holding that the
right to privacy does not extend to subpoenaed bank records).
93. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). For an example of how the Department of
Justice has implemented the Privacy Act, see Exemption of Federal Bureau of
Investigation Systems - limited access, 28 C.F.R. § 16.96 (2003).
94. Richard. D. Rasmussen, Is International Travel Per Se Suspicion Of
Terrorism? The Dispute Between The United States and European Union Over
Passenger Name Record Data Transfers, 26 Wisc. INT'L L.J. 551, 565 (2008).
95. See 28 C.F.R. § 16.96(g)(1).
96. See Final Report by EU-US High Level Contact Group on Information
Sharing and Privacy and Personal Data Protection, Council Document 9831/08,
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Accordingly, the U.S. federal court system provides a patchwork
of protection, covering certain types of personal data (e.g., under
the Fair Credit Reporting Act) 9 7 and with varying degrees of
scrutiny. Notably, PNR data is not specifically recognized as a
protected category of data under U.S. laws, and no provisions have
been made specifically to restrict its transfer. 98
Concurrently, a number of legislative measures were passed that
cumulatively provide law enforcement and other government
agencies considerably greater access to, and sharing of, personal
data for surveillance purposes.99 These measures further limited the
extent of oversight and the review of actions taken in data
collection for counter-terrorism purposes. 00 To reinforce this point,
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was created
with the explicit purpose of streamlining the collection and sharing
of data within the U.S. intelligence infrastructure by promoting an
"information sharing environment" that could be extended to areas
of the private sector. 101
4. Possible Significance of Divergences
While both the U.S. and the EU legal systems make some
provision for a right to privacy in the case of personal data, and set
out legal scenarios in which this right may be subverted to preserve
national security, the balance struck diverges fairly markedly.
As set out in Part II, the EU legal regime is premised on the
basic inviolability of personal data, so that any processing, transfer
or use of such data must occur within codified and legislatively
demarcated circumstances. A limitation of Directive 95/46 rights in
(May 28, 2008) [hereinafter Final Report], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice
home/fsj/privacy/news/docs/report_02_07_08_en.pdf.
97. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
98. See Final Report, supra note 96, at 3 (discussing EU-U.S. proposed data
protection policies).
99. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-63 (2006); Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001).
100. See 50 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
101. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, 3665 (2004).
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the interests of national security must be narrowly construed and
handled on a case-by-case basis. While it has been noted that the
demands created by the Directive are perceived as cumbersome for
businesses, 10 2 the comprehensive protections provided by the
Directive demonstrates a consciousness of the normatively
protected position of personal data within the EU legislative
framework. Therefore, the Directive's interaction with the U.S.
legal system, where the right to privacy for personal data is more
limited, may reasonably be assumed to be problematic.
The EU and U.S. legal systems may strike a different normative
balance between the right to privacy and the right for the state to
monitor, transfer, or retain data for national security reasons. This
balance considers factors such as regulatory structure, cultural
history, and popular perceptions on the role of government.
However, the structure and jurisprudence of an international regime
for data sharing for national security purposes is distinct from each
of the systems that inform its creation. First, the international
transfer of data to another country will likely necessitate a loss of
regulatory oversight and control over the data for the transferring
jurisdiction. 0 3 However, this loss may not automatically result in a
corresponding gain of legal control to the transferee, because the
data does not always relate to subjects and controllers within the
transferee's jurisdiction. In addition, service providers that channel
the data, such as airlines and SWIFT, may also be subject to a
cross-jurisdictional regulatory regime if it is based in the
jurisdiction of the transferor or another body. Accordingly, the full
range of enforcement and regulatory oversight mechanisms
generally available to domestic regulators is unlikely to apply to the
international legal regime for the transfer and sharing of data.
Second, the transfer of personal data across borders is likely to
add to existing domestic data reserves and thus significantly
increase the volume of data that becomes subject to oversight by a
transferee jurisdiction. The enforcement limitations of an
international regime and the increased volume of data collection
make a set of highly prescriptive and exacting standards for data
102. See HEISENBERG, supra note 54, at 31.
103. See Working Party, Opinion 6/2002, supra note 11, at 8.
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protection difficult to implement practically. Concerns over less
stringent standards for data transfer may be met with a stricter
evidentiary threshold before data is transmitted and either full or
partial access is granted.
Notwithstanding the diverging legal regimes, any transatlantic
standard will require a new focus. While any consensus to identify
the evidentiary thresholds and the level of protection to be provided
on transfer may be politically challenging, the continuing global
terrorist threat underscores its importance. Furthermore, the
absence of codification may diminish the overall credibility of
governments to protect their citizens' data in the long run, by
placing private actors between conflicting legal regimes. The
resulting uncertainty may give way to the possibility of
governments acting unilaterally (and secretly) to obtain the desired
data.
IV. NEXT STEPS
1. Current Proposal to Reach an EU-U.S. Agreement on Data
Privacy
In June 2008, The New York Times reported that the U.S. and the
EU were close to an agreement on the sharing of personal data
between their respective governments for purposes of law
enforcement and security.'0 The agreement could potentially
provide the legal basis for the transfer of a number of categories of
personal data, such as credit card records, Internet-browsing habits,
travel, and financial records.'0o However, it seems that negotiations
are far from complete. The EU-U.S. High Level Contact Group, an
informal body formed to lay the groundwork for a potential
resolution to the transatlantic data privacy issue, published a report
setting out twelve principles to use as a basis for an accord on data
privacy, and submitted this report to the EU-U.S. Summit in June
2008.106
104. See Charlie Savage, US and Europe Near Accord on Privacy, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2008, at Al.
105. See id.
106. See Final Report, supra note 96. These 12 principles are listed in Section
2(b): "1. Purpose Specification/Purpose Limitation; 2. Integrity/Data Quality; 3.
2009] 93
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However, in addition to the twelve core principles, the report
also sets out a number of areas of conflict with the potential to
impede progress in this area. These conflicting areas range from the
legal nature of the agreement (whether it should be binding,
expounded as "soft law," or a political declaration) to the role of
reciprocity. The areas identified are politically polarizing,
reflecting the underlying normative divergence between the EU and
U.S. legal systems. 107 For example, the office of the European Data
Privacy Supervisor has observed considerable legal tension in the
probable role of private entities in the transfer of information.
Considering the role played by SWIFT and the airlines, European
authorities have expressed concern about the role of private entities
in any new data-sharing regime with public entities.
Institutionalizing their position within an information sharing
framework may have repercussions for the rest of the EU, where
similar intra-EU exchange mechanisms may be demanded on the
same terms as those agreed between the EU and the U.S. Thus,
notions of privacy in data held by EU private entities become fairly
meaningless. Also, any agreement may obscure the debate as to
whether a regime should focus on regulating the collection of data
from certain types of data controllers, or whether it should
concentrate on collecting data generated for certain purposes. 08 It
has also been suggested that private entities may be particularly
susceptible to pressure exerted by governmental regulatory bodies
(e.g., the SWIFT and PNR data cases), such that they may be more
Relevant and Necessary/Proportionality; 4. Information Security; 5. Special
Categories of Personal Information (sensitive data); 6. Accountability; 7.
Independent and Effective Oversight; 8. Individual Access and Rectification; 9.
Transparency and Notice; 10. Redress; 11. Automated Individual Decisions; 12.
Restrictions on Onward Transfers to Third Countries." Id. at 4.
107. See id at 7. These areas are: "l. Consistency in private entities'
obligations during data transfers; 2. Equivalent and reciprocal application of
privacy and personal data protection law; 3. Preventing undue impact on relations
with third countries; 4. Specific agreements regulating information exchanges and
privacy and personal data protection; and 5. Issues related to the institutional
framework of the EU and US." Id.
108. See Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Final
Report by the EU-US High Level Contact Group on Information Sharing and
Privacy and Personal Data Protection, 2009 O.J. (C 128) 1, % 21-22, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eulLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:128:0001:
0012:EN:PDF.
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amenable to going above and beyond a narrow construction of
limitations set out in any agreement in dealing with regulatory
bodies. Other points of conflict include ensuring effective avenues
of redress for European citizens whose data may have been
mishandled by U.S. authorities, 109 definitional uncertainty
regarding the use of terms such as "law enforcement," or "public
security,"o and uncertainty regarding legal assessments of
"adequacy" under EU law."
2. Potential Risks with the Proposed Approach
Given the high policy importance of combating the terrorist
threat through concerted action, and the strategic value of ensuring
proper regulation of data collection to avoid a repeat of the SWIFT
and PNR cases, progress made by EU and U.S. regulators toward
an accord in this area may be seen as a positive step. Nevertheless,
in addition to the areas of uncertainty identified by the High Level
Contact Group report, a number of points may be made in respect
of the current proposal.
First, while the final text of an agreement remains elusive, the
current proposal and debate arguably conflate different types of
data into a single category meriting an equal standard of protection.
However, it would be more helpful to determine whether certain
types of data require a higher standard of review before they are
transferred or subject to surveillance. A hierarchy of protection is
captured in the category of "sensitive data" in current legislation,
but it may be worth considering whether other types of data should
be included within a similar bracket. Examples include data
pertaining to personal bank accounts, employment and tax
information, and information relating to marriage or medical
records. While such classifications may be considered arbitrary,
this type of approach may be helpful in speeding up the processing
and exchange of less sensitive and controversial information. When
a category of information has been identified as requiring more
robust review, requests from a transferee country/agency should
109. See id. 11.
110. See id. 25.
111. See id. 40.
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provide a more substantive justification for the request.
Furthermore, such categorization may focus the attention of
agencies on the relative sensitivity of particular categories of
information, such that information of a certain sensitivity is only
requested in circumstances where its retrieval and use can be
considered particularly probative.
Second, the tentative agreement appears to be framed by a list of
principles on which the new regime is to be based. Although such
principles may be seen as necessary to accommodate the divergent
legal regimes in the U.S. and the EU, a list of principles may only
be useful in providing a political "olive branch" to demonstrate
accord between the two blocs, without adding any real substance to
an international privacy standard for intelligence collection. Indeed,
many of the principles set out in the report of the High Level
Contact Group are already reflected to some extent in current
legislation and arrangements for SWIFT and PNR data. However,
in the absence of clarity on the interaction of the agreement with
existing legal regimes, U.S. and EU national security provisions
may override the principles. The broad wording of the principles' 1 2
lends the agreement little legal weight. Although difficult to create,
clear rules or best practice guidelines would provide more specific
operational direction on the application of the principles. Moreover,
given the difficulties likely to be faced in enforcing the
international agreement, providing detailed rules or best practice
guidelines may be more reassuring than relying on observance of
principles. This would allow for a clearer way to measure
observance of the terms of the agreement by authorities.
Finally, the language of the High Level Contact Group report
and the opinion provided by the European Data Protection
Supervisor appears to show considerable reluctance in relaxing the
existing paradigms related to "adequacy" merely to assure a close
fit between the two legal regimes. The creation of an international
regime may require negotiating somewhere between the positions
taken by each system, without necessarily adopting the architecture
of one or the other. While this may be politically unpopular, the
implications of failing to reach an accord may be particularly
112. See Final Report, supra note 96, at 4.
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unpleasant for a number of actors, such as private parties holding
the data and the data subjects whose rights may be circumvented
through secret, unilateral action. As demonstrated by the case of the
Czech Republic, the U.S. may seek to obtain data through bilateral
agreements, thus undermining the negotiating position of the EU. It
is not suggested that any accord reach for a "lowest common
denominator" in protecting the privacy rights of citizens, but it may
be helpful to relax assessments of "adequacy" while seeking to
expound rules and guidelines that would provide measurable
direction to agencies. Furthermore, an agreement may seek to set a
high threshold of review before the data is transferred, due to the
enforcement limitations of an international accord and the loss of
post-transfer control. Unfortunately, as suggested earlier, the
aggressive stance recently taken in the area of national security
legislation and the apparent precedence given to executive action
over the protection of civil liberties may have polarized the position
of the EU in this area. It remains to be seen how progress in this
area may evolve during the course of the Obama Administration.
IV. CONCLUSION
Current disparities between EU and U.S. laws on data privacy
have led to considerable diplomatic and legal unease. Given the
tremendous speed and volume of data creation in the digital age,
the importance of establishing clear procedures to use such data
optimally and lawfully against potential terrorist threats has never
been greater. An examination of the current state of play in this
area demonstrates the highly charged and politicized nature of the
concepts of "data," "privacy," and "national security," such that
agreement on how to approach data management does not appear
feasible without a broad, overarching political agreement.
However, as amply demonstrated by the legally ambiguous
positions of European airlines and SWIFT, inaction in this area
may lead to the greater danger of abandoning the interests of the
very constituencies that regulators are seeking to protect. There is
also the potential for opening the door to series of bilateral accords
that circumvent EU institutions altogether. While the EU's robust
approach to data privacy is laudable, some compromise may be
necessary to move forward in establishing a transnational data
2009] 97
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privacy framework. At the same time, a U.S. position that more
protectively safeguards privacy rights may be beneficial in
softening the hard edges of EU data privacy legislation. In light of
the broader interests of security and economic prosperity, a
proactive agreement, as opposed to reacting to the consequences of
inaction, would be more beneficial to all.
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